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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BAILEY SERVICE k SUPPLY
Corporation, a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vT H E S T A T E O F U T A H , by and
through its R O A D COMMISSION,
Defendant-AppelUmt.

I Case No.
I

13857

B R I E F OF APPELLANTS

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower
court on cross motions for summary judgment for
money damages awarded to the plaintiff by reason of
the erection of a viaduct on Fourth South Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT
Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff
for money damages under a Memorandum Decision
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2
finding a "taking" resulting from the erection of the
viaduct. (R. 11-12)
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellant seeks a ruling reversing the judgment
of the lower court as being contrary to the law in this
jurisdiction, and awarding judgment of no cause of
action to appellant as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The controversy arises out of the erection of a
viaduct over the railroad tracks West on Fourth South
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, by the defendant-appellant. Whereas, plaintiff had been able to use the whole
width of Fourth South Street to gain access to its
property prior to the construction, thereafter vehicles
of the size previously used were not able to be utilized
because the wall of the viaduct left 22'8" (two lanes)
in front of the property and physically prevented use
of the whole width of the street to maneuver.
For reasons which are not relevant to the issue
here the State Road Commission authorized the execution of a Stipulation purporting to waive Governmental
Immunity. (R. 71)
However, prior to argument by the respective
parties of the cross motions for summary judgment, defendant determined that the attempt to
waive Governmental Immunity was in all probability
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3
without lawful sanction and so advised plaintiff. The
issue of Governmental Immunity was raised in the
memorandum supporting defendants motion for summary Judgment (R. 29) and argued in the lower court.
Defendants answer did put in issue the stating of a
claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 68)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ONLY T H E LEGISLATURE OF T H E
STATE OF U T A H HAS AUTHORITY
TO W A I V E G O V E R N M E N T A L IMM U N I T Y IN U T A H AND T H E LOWE R COURT E R R E D I N R E F U S I N G
TO C O N S I D E R O R G I V E DUE
W E I G H T TO T H I S I S S U E .
Until 1965 Utah operated under a rule of law
long and firmly established, of complete Governmental
Immunity. The 1965 session of the Utah Legislature
enacted what is now Chapter 30 of Title 63, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, and known and cited
as "The Utah Governmental Immunity Act". The
effect of the Act is not only to waive the states immunity for certain conduct on the part of agencies or
units of government, but also to legislatively retain,
reinforce and sanction the ancient rule of Governmental
Immunity in respect to other areas of conduct. I t is
submitted that the legislature retained, reinforced and
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4
maintained Governmental Immunity for the acts for
which plaintiff has sought relief in the instant case.
Section 3 of the referenced Act provides:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in
the act, all governmental entities shall be
immune from suit for any injury which may
result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and
discharge of a governmental function."
Other provisions of the Act waive immunity for
certain matters (i.e. contractual obligation, Sec. 5; unsafe highways, Sec. 8) but in no provision of the Act
is it "otherwise provided" that Governmental Immunity
is waived for actions such as that brought by the plaintiff in this case. Thus., Section 3 of the Act serves as
an insurmountable barrier to the successful maintenance
of this case by plaintiff. The lower court, counsel, and
the Road Commission are without legal authority to
set aside this affirmative action of the Legislature of
this State.
I n some jurisdictions the Attorney General has the
powers of an attorney general at common law, and
Utah so ruled in Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d. 47,
456 P.2d 177 (1969). This decision states the following
proposition:
. . . the Attorney General, in the absence of
express legislative restriction to the contrary,
may exercise all such power and authority as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the public interests may from time to time require. I n short the Attorney General's powers
are as broad as the common law unless restricted or modified by statute . . .
Appellant submits that the legislature by enacting the
Governmental Immunity Act in 1965 effectively preempted the otherwise inherent right of the Attorney
General to waive Sovereign Immunity if indeed the
Attorney General ever in fact had the right to waive
Sovereign Immunity in any case.
In Fairclough v. Salt Lake Co. 10 Utah 2d 117
(1960) the Court held that sovereign immunity could
not be waived except by constitutional or legislative
enactment. The court further held that neither by constitutional nor legislative action had that doctrine been
waived in this jurisdiction. The court said:
. . . consistently and historically we have
ruled that the State may not be sued without
its consent, that Article I, § 22 of our Constitution is not self executing, nor does it give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise; and that
to secure such consent is a legislative matter
. . . (emphasis added)
Further, in the Fairclough case, supra, the court quoted
from Hjorth v. Whittenhurg, 121 Utah 324 (1952)
on this issue of sovereign immunity:
This phase of our law is well established
and of long standing. If it is to be changed,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that must come through the sovereign power
of the commonwealth, the people, speaking
through the legislature, (emphasis added)
I t is thus the clearly enunciated rule in this jurisdiction
that Governmental Immunity is waived only by legislative authority and not by agencies, departments or
employees of the State.
As heretofore observed the legislature has since
these cases, enacted the Governmental Immunity Act,
but this enactment restates and reinforces sovereign immunity in the area at issue here. Decisions of this court
since passage of the Governmental Immunity Act
strongly reinforce this position.
I n State Road Commission v. Utah Sugar Company, 22 Utah 2d 77 (1968), a case coming after enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act, the court
clearly ruled that for actions of this type the Sovereign
Immunity and the police power of the State had not been
waived by legislative action when it said at p. 81:
"Nor does the right to ingress or egress
to or from ones property include any right in
and to existing public traffic on the highway
. . . The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by police power of the State
and what this police power may give an
abutting property owner . . . it may take
away. . . ."
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The court went on to say that diversion of traffic was
not compensable in that case "because such damages
are 'damnum absque injuria' or damages without legal
injury."
A case even more to the point is the recent (1973)
one of Holt v. Utah State Road Commission 30 Utah
2d 4. Therein the plaintiff sought to recover damages
for impaired access, precisely as in the instant case. After
observing that there was no taking of property involved
in that action, a condition identical again with the case
at issue, the court, speaking through Justice Crockett
held:
The law has long been established in this
State that under these circumstances there can
be no recovery from the State for damages
because the construction of a highway may
impair or adversely affect the convenience of
access to property.
The court then cites a series of cases by footnote, most
of which are referred to in this brief, as having established that rule. Thus, it appears clearly that this court
has maintained, since the passage of the Governmental
Immunity Act, the long established rule of sovereign
immunity and the valid exercise of the police power.
But we are not left to conjecture as to the courts intent
in Holt supra, for the court goes on to say that plaintiffs there urged that since the Governmental Immunity
Act, it "should now be construed as permitting the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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maintenance of such an action". After quoting Section
3 of the Act, supra, the court concludes:
This seems to indicate an intention that
the Act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity; and to waive it only as clearly
expressed therein,,
I t is apparent from the authorities cited, both the
Governmental Immunity Act and the case law, that the
attempted waiver by the authority of the State Road
Commission and counsel, of the States' immunity in
this case was void from the beginning, the legislature
being the only body authorized to waive the State's
immunity.
In its Memorandum Decision (R. 11) the lower
court attempts to distinguish Springville Banking Company v. Burton 10 Utah 2d 100 by noting that that case
was a case of sovereign immunity with no taking and
resulting inconvenience. I t is respectfully urged that
this distinction is non existent since those are the identical factors existing in both cases. After noting that the
issue of sovereign immunity had been raised by defendant the court says in its Memorandum Decision:
However, in its brief at the top of page
10 defendant quotes a section from '3 Nichols
on Eminent Domain' which quotation would
indicate that the Springville Banking Case
and other Utah cases following the general
theory set forth therein, would not apply.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant can only conclude that the Honorable Judge
of the lower court views Nichols admittedly a pre-eminent authority in his field,as empowered to overrule not
only the wisdom of the Legislature of Utah but also
the judgments of this Honorable Court. With due deference to the excellence of both the authority (Nichols)
and the lower court, we respectfully suggest that this
is not and cannot be the status of the law in this jurisdiction.
I n any event, the citation from Nichols, while accepted and urged by the defendant is not germane nor
relevant to the issue for which it was cited by the lower
court. There is no dearth of matters for which the law
would and does allow compensation provided there is
a lawful vehicle for getting the matter before the court
and the police power is not prohibitive.
The fact that the damages alleged may be recoverable except for the valid and time honored bar of Sovereign Immunity does not work to invalidate the otherwise
quite proper exercise of that bar. The quotation cited
from Nichols deals with the compensability or non compensationability of a damage in eminent domain. This
is not a case of eminent domain. The use of the citation
by defendant in its brief as cited by the lower court was
addressed to the merits of plaintiff's case, not to the
issue of Sovereign Immunity and further reference will
be made thereto in the section of this brief dealing with
the merits. Defendant asserts that the error of plaintiff's
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argument, as indeed the position adopted by the court
below, is the assumption that all damage is compensable.
The law of sovereign immunity and the valid exercise
of the police power both represent areas where the court
has negated that assumption on numerous occasions.
(Springville Banking Company v. Burton,
Supra;
Anderson Investment Corporation v. Utah State Road
Commission, et aL, 28 Utah 2d 379; Hurst v. Highway
Department of State of Utah, 16 Utah 2d 153; and
cases therein cited.)
POINT II
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N
CONCLUDING T H A T T H E R E H A D
BEEN A COMPENSABLE TAKING
F R O M P L A I N T I F F S I N C E T H E VIADUCT
WAS
BUILT
ENTIRELY
W I T H I N T H E R I G H T OF W A Y AND
R E A S O N A B L E A C C E S S TO P L A I N TIFFS PROPERTY
REMAINED
A F T E R T H E CONSTRUCTION.
I t appears from the Memorandum Decision (R.
1 1 - 1 2 ) of the lower court that the court did not even
consider the police power doctrine nor the doctrine of
damnum absque injuria, notwithstanding the numerous
decisions of this court accepting and reinforcing those
doctrines (Springville Bank, Anderson Investment,
Hurst . . . supra) The parties have agreed that plaintiff could no longer use the whole of the street to maneuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vre large vehicles into its facilities on Fourth South
Street. The placing of a raised median divider as in the
Springville Banking case, supra, would have had the
identical result. Thus, for purposes of this case the erection of the viaduct may be considered as a raised median
in testing the compensability of the alleged "take". At
the hearing before the lower court on cross motions for
summary judgment counsel for plaintiff objected that
the exhibits attached to defendants memorandum in
support of its motion were not sworn to. Then and now
defendant asserts that no such formality is required
since plaintiffs own affidavits contain an admission of
the matter sought to be demonstrated by these exhibits;
i.e., that prior to the erecting of the viaduct plaintiffs
required the use of Fourth South across the center
line thereof to gain access by its large vehicles. (R. 46)
We respectfully suggest that this court may take
judicial notice of the fact that large type vehicles do
in fact cross the centerline of streets in gaining access to
particular properties. Painted medians do not deter
such utilization no matter how marked. Does this usage,
frequently carried on in direct violation of law and
city ordinances, ripen into a vested right? Or, does the
jurisdictional authority retain the right to control this
and other uses by erecting raised medians or other
structures to control traffic? I t is asserted that at best
the users acquire no more than permisive and temporary
right. To view the matter otherwise is to ignore the long
line of cases both before and since the Springville Banking case, supra. Further, to hold otherwise would be to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reverse the long standing rule that one may not adverse
the Sovereign (Cassity v. Castango, 10 Utah 2d 16;
City of Oakland v. Burns 296 P.2d 33.)
On this question, i.e., the acquisition of rights as
against the city, town or other governmental body in
connection with streets, it is submitted that the provisions of § 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended are dispositive. That statute is explicit when it
says:
No person shall be allowed to acquire
any right or title in or to any lands held by
any town, city or county, or the corporate
authorities thereof, designated for public use
as streets . . . or for any other public purpose,
by adverse possession thereof for any length
of time . . . (emphasis added)
The rule is clear that "one may not adverse the Sovereign". (Cassity v. Castango, supra; Lund v. Wilcooo, 34
Utah 205). There is ample case and encyclopedia law
in support of this position. (55 A L R 2d 598)
There exists no absolute right to unreasonably deny
access to property owners who front upon the public
thoroughfare. Neither the police power reasonably to
regulate the usage of the thoroughfare nor the principle
of Sovereign Immunity have been held absolutely to
bar recovery for unreasonable interference with abutters
right of access. In Springville Banking, supra, the court
noted at P . 103 that the principles of equity could be
invoked to prevent unreasonable interference with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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abutters rights. Hampton v. State Road Commission
21 Utah 2d 342 clearly establishes that the principle
of Sovereign Immunity must yield in the case of a
complete or nearly complete denial of access. Defendant
does not take issue with the principles ennunciated in
that case but on the contrary regards them as salutary.
Nevertheless, the question here is not such a one. Here
as in Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,, supra, "access
has not been denied, interfered with, it is true, but . . .
to no unreasonable extent".
The rule of Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.
2d 865, quoted at length in Nichols on Eminent Domain
§ 5.72 at 166 correctly gives perspective to the issues
of this case when reveiwed on its merits, where it is said:
The owner of property abutting a public
way has a right of ingress to and egress from
his property . . . However, these are rights
subordinate to the underlying right of the
public to enjoy the public way to its fullest
extent as well as the right of the public to have
the way improved to meet the demands of
public convenience and necessity. If the improvement for the benefit of the public interferes with the preexisting means of ingress
and egress. . . enjoyed by the individual property owner without an actual physical invasion
of the land of the property owner, then again
we have a situation where the individual right
is subordinate to the public good and any alleged damages suffered is damnum absque
injuria. This is so for the simple reason that
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one who acquires property abutting a public
way acquires it subject and subordinate to the
right of the public to have the way improved
to meet the public need."
No reference is made in the above citation to Sovereign
Immunity but the issue is determined solely on the public
interest on the merits, Absent this rule the danger forseen by Justice Henroid in the Springville Banking
casej supra, must be recognized: "Highways would remain unmarked (unimproved) because of the prohibitive
cost involved in payment of damages to owners on both
sides . . . "
The court further held in the cited case:
I n this area of the freeway citizens must
yield to the common weal, albeit injury to their
property may result. W e espouse the notion
that if the Sovereign exercises its police power
reasonably and for the good of all the people,
when constructing highways, consequential
damages such as those alleged here are not
compensable."
The issue, then, is not one of the existence or amount
of damages, but one of compensability. I n order for the
plaintiff to finally prevail in this matter it is submitted
that it must show a material distinction between its
circumstances and those which have prevailed in the long
line of divider and viaduct cases which have been ruled
upon by this court and supported by the overwhelming
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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weight of authority from other jurisdictions. I t is respectfully suggested that no such distinction exists.
In Anderson Investment Corporation v. Utah
State Road Commission et al., 28 Utah 2d 379 this
court dealt with a case practically on all fours with the
instant proceedings. There the State constructed a viaduct on North Temple Street in Salt Lake City, the
east end of which was placed in front of the plaintiffs
property. The viaduct was erected on property owned
by the State and no real estate was required or acquired
from the plaintiff. The width of the street remaining
in front of plaintiff's property was "Seduced, but a lane
of traffic east on North Temple street remained. Plaintiff in the cited case sought approximately $38,000 in
damages for impairment of access, ingress and egress,
depreciation of its property and for changing grade in
front of its premises among other things. The plaintiff
relied on State v. Fourth Judicial District Court 94
Utah 384 where the court by Dicta had implied a liability on the part of the individual road commissioners
though the commission itself was held to be immune
from suit. This court speaking through Justice Ellett
said:
" ( H ) ere these Commissioners were in the
performance of their duties in the exercise of
the police power of the State to better provide
for the orderly flow of traffic upon the highways of this state. They are thus given the
same immunity from suit as is given to the
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State of Utah or to its commissioners", (emphasis added)
We urge that any practical distinction between the
instant case and Anderson Investment, supra, favors
the latter, since the width of the street remaining in
front of Andersons was considerably less than the plaintiff in this action enjoys. Otherwise it is difficult to
find a distinction since the viaducts are built within
four blocks of each other in the same city and subject to
the same legal principles.
Plaintiff here claims $8700 damages because of its
need to build a new access point for its large type
vehicles which can no longer maneuver across the whole
width of Fourth South Street. On its merits, therefore,
the case becomes one of ''reasonable" access. Two lanes
of traffic (more than 22 feet) remain in front of plaintiffs premises and thus it is clear that reasonable access
remains for any ordinary usage. Does the particular
usage being engaged in by the plaintiff at the time of the
construction justify a different view? The bulk of defendants memorandum in the court below was directed
to this question. I t is submitted that the text and case
law clearly demonstrates that no such view is justified.
May a particular use ripen into a compensable right
as against the Sovereign?
A case almost identical in its facts was before the
court in Moorlane Co. v. Highway Department of the
State of Texas, 384 S.W. 2d 415 (1964). The defen-
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dants had constructed a viaduct and a controlled access
highway through Amarillo which made it impossible for
large trucks to turn into plaintiff's building, but which
was wide enough for ordinary traffic flow. The court
held at p. 418:
The appellants still had access to their
property and trucks could load and unload at
the truck bay of appellants, although the large
trucks could not use this street in its entirety
as had been used before the overpass was built
and were not entitled to recover damages from
appellees because they could not use all or a
greater portion of the street in backing the
large trucks across the street.
The facts of the Moorlane case are restated in the
holding and are, it is suggested, identical to those which
concern us here. The quoted portion of that ruling
might be lifted verbatim into a commentary on the
facts of our case. But Texas has not stopped there. I n
a subsequent decision, Collins v. City of San Antonio
443, S.W. 2d 563 (1969) it is said: "The interference
with plaintiffs access from Guadalupe Street appears
to be greater than that which resulted from the construction of the improvements in Moorlane." Yet, after
noting that the question of unreasonable interference
with a land owners right of access is one of law, the
court says: "We hold that as a matter of law, plaintiff
still has reasonable access to his property from Guadalupe Street."
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I n this context we refer to the citation from Nichols
which the lower court deemed sufficient to amend the
settled law of this jurisdiction. I n 3 Nichols y Eminent
Domain § 10.221 (5) at 377 it is said:
By the great weight of authority, it has
been held that the extent of an abutters right
of access may be reasonably regulated in the
public interest. Such regulation, however,
cannot validly extend to the point of total
deprivation of access without incurring liability to pay compensation".
Elsewhere in this brief we have asserted defendants
recognition of this general rule as salutary. Our dissatisfaction with the ruling of the lower court rests with
the apparent assumption that the rule proves the fact.
I t seems that the first sentence of the citation has been
completely ignored, and that the last sentence is deemed
a statement of fact in this case. How can it be reasonably
said that a two lane road, in excess of 22 feet in width
constitutes a "total deprivation of access"? We respectfully suggest that the rule of "reasonableness" of access
has not yet been applied to the facts of this case. Thus,
the issue boils down to whether or not the particular
use heretofore made by the plaintiff in derogation of
the right of passage and utilization of the roadway by
other members of the public ripens into a compensable
right when redressed in favor of the public in general.
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The case and text law cited hereinabove clearly
shows that if the decision of the lower court is allowed
to stand this jurisdiction has significantly retreated
from, if not overturned, a long established rule as enunciated by this court, and adhered to by our sister states,
and has embarked on a singular course.
CONCLUSION
The action of the lower court in failing to consider
the States immunity under the law was and is error.
Neither the State Road Commission nor counsel is
vested with authority to abrogate the legislative reaffirmation of Sovereign Immunity appearing in the
statutes of this State as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, defendant was entitled to judgment
of dismissal as a matter of law.
A consideration of this case on its merits also entitles defendant to a judgment of dismissal. The interference with plaintiffs access is not unreasonable on
the criteria established by this court and followed by
other jurisdictions. On the contrary it clearly appears
that the construction of the viaduct was in furtherance
of the duties and responsibilities of the State Road
Commission in the public interest and that the control of
traffic resulting therefrom was well within the police
power of the State. Thus any damages suffered by the
plaintiffs must be held to be damnum absque injuria
and non compensatory under the settled law of this
jurisdiction.
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I t is respectfully urged that this court reverse the
judgment of the lower court and judgment be ordered
for defendant as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
M A R K A. M A D S E N
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for

Appellants
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